DECOTIIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/21/2015 10:43 AM

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH V. UNIVERSITY OF
MASSACHUSETTS: AN “INAPPROPRIATE”
RELIANCE ON CAHILL
William P. DeCotiis
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Rehnquist, discussing the Supreme Court’s original and
exclusive jurisdiction once wrote “[t]he absence of limiting
principles . . . I fear, ‘could well pave the way for putting this Court into
a quandary whereby we must opt either to pick and choose
arbitrarily . . . or devote truly enormous portions of our energies to
such matters.’”1
On August 19, 2013, the Federal Circuit found itself in the
quandary Justice Rehnquist perceptively foresaw, in the form of an
inventorship dispute entitled University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
zur Forderung der Wissenschaften e.V (Max-Planck). In the case, a state
university, The University of Utah (“UUtah”), sought to sue another
state university, the University of Massachusetts (UMass), over the
inventorship status of patented RNAi technology. Because UUtah and
UMass are both arms of their respective states, such an action
effectively amounts to the State of Utah suing the State of
Massachusetts.
A suit between two states falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. In an effort to avoid the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, UUtah named UMass officials as defendants
rather than UMass.2 The district court accepted jurisdiction over the
case, and on appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
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1
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 770 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(citing Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 504 (1971)).
2
University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der
Wissenschaften e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

679

DECOTIIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

680

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

4/21/2015 10:43 AM

[Vol. 45:679

properly exercised its jurisdiction over the dispute.3 In justifying the
exercise of jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit imposed limits on the
Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, derived primarily from the
Second Circuit case of Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill.4 The
imposed limits, however, lacked solid footing in Supreme Court
precedent and, as a result, the court misapplied foundational legal
doctrine. Furthermore, in order to prevent the case from being
dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party, the Federal Circuit
found that UMass was not an indispensable party despite having
ownership rights in the patent-at-issue, citing a narrow exception the
Ninth Circuit created in the case of Dainippon Screen Manufacturing Co.5
Thus, by attempting to impose arbitrary limitations on the Supreme
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit placed widely
accepted joinder rules in a precarious position.
Part II of this Comment discusses the relevant legal doctrine at
issue. Part III of this Comment analyzes the reasoning of Max-Planck
and undertakes a review of the underlying reasoning in Cahill and
Dainippon. Part IV of this Comment argues for a statutory exception
that permits patent disputes concerning ownership to be vindicated
between state universities in lower courts. Alternatively, this part
argues that Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Cahill be adopted as the
proper statutory analysis for interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)—which
sets forth the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. Part V
concludes.
II. RELEVANT LEGAL DOCTRINE
A. Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1251 and Sovereign Immunity
Article II § 2 cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides for
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over controversies between
states:6 “[i]n all Cases . . . in which a State shall be a Party, the
Original
[S]upreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.”7
jurisdiction is limited statutorily to areas in which the Supreme Court
has exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) and areas in which
the Supreme Court has original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction under

3
4
5
6
7

Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1320.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3).8 According to § 1251(a), “[t]he Supreme
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies
between two or more states.”9 Under § 1251(b)(3), by contrast, the
“Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of . . .
[a]ll actions or proceedings by a state against the citizens of another
State or against aliens.”10 Thus, in the context of Max-Planck, naming
UMass (the State of Massachusetts) a party to the suit against UUtah
(the State of Utah) invoked the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and statutorily permitted only the Supreme Court to exercise
jurisdiction over the dispute. Conversely, under § 1251(b)(3), if a state
sues a citizen of another state—i.e., UUtah sues a resident of another
state—the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction is not invoked, and
the district court may exercise jurisdiction.
Outside of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
provided in § 1251(a), states and state actors are immune from suit
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment
provides, in pertinent part: “[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”11
Thus generally, a state, or an officer of a state acting in his or her
official capacity, is immune from suit. Consequently, in the context of
patents, a state can neither be sued for infringement nor forced to
defend against an action for a declaratory judgment because it is
immune from suit.12
As mentioned supra, states do not enjoy sovereign immunity from
suits other states bring; rather, such disputes fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.13 States can also sue citizens of
other states without raising issues of sovereign immunity and without
invoking the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.14 Thus, in the
context of Max-Planck, UUtah (the State of Utah) could sue UMass
(the State of Massachusetts) in the Supreme Court of the United States
under § 1251(a), and UUtah (the State of Utah) could sue a private
citizen (or corporation) of Massachusetts if such citizen were an owner
8

28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
Id.
10
Id. § 1251(b)(3).
11
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
12
Id. See also A123 Sys. Inc. v. Hydro-Que., 626 F.3d 1213, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
13
University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der
Wissenschaften e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013). See also Texas v. New
Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130 (1984).
14
Id. at 1319–20.
9
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of a disputed patent. But under the Eleventh Amendment, UUtah
theoretically cannot sue a state official acting within the scope of his or
her official capacity (as UUtah did by naming UMass officials rather
than UMass) outside of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court because suing an official is akin to suing the state itself.
B. Ex Parte Young Doctrine
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court created a narrow exception
to sovereign immunity, which allows a federal court to treat
unconstitutional, official acts of state officers as being separate from
state action, so that the officers can be enjoined without being barred
by a state’s sovereign immunity.15 Thus, in the context of Max-Planck,
UUtah theoretically should only be able to sue a state officer for official
acts if such official acts are unconstitutional. In Max-Planck, there is no
suggestion that the actions of UMass officials were unconstitutional.
C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) Indispensability
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, a party is required to
be joined if feasible,16 and if the party cannot be joined, the court must
determine whether “in equity and good conscience, the action should
proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.”17 Factors
a court is to consider in making this determination are:
(1) The extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s
absence might prejudice that person or the existing
parties;
(2) The extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or
avoided by:
(A) Protective provisions in the judgment;
(B) Shaping the relief; or
(C) Other measures;
(3) Whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence
would be adequate; and
(4) Whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if
the action were dismissed for non-joinder.18
The court in Max-Planck found that UMass was not an indispensable
party, despite the fact that UMass had ownership rights in the patent
and that any judgment would directly alter the allocation of ownership
over the patent.
15
16
17
18

Id. at 1321.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
Id.
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III. RELEVANT CASE LAW
A. Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill
i.

Procedural history

In Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed a suit brought
by Connecticut (Plaintiff-Appellant) for declaratory and injunctive
relief against John P. Cahill and Donald W. Brewer (DefendantAppellees), ruling that the suit was a “controversy between two or more
States falling within the Supreme Court’s original and exclusive
jurisdiction under § 1251(a).”19
ii.

Facts

The dispute in Cahill arose out of the enforcement of New York’s
Environmental Conservation Law.20 Under the law, residents of New
York, or states that awarded reciprocal permits to New York residents,
could obtain New York commercial permits for lobstering, but only
New York residents were permitted to take lobsters from designated
areas of New York waters in Long Island Sound near Fishers Island.21
In November 1997, Gordon C. Colvin, Director of Marine Resources
for the New York Department of Environmental Conservation, sent a
letter to the Lobsterman’s Association informing it that the provision
preventing non-New York residents from lobstering in the designated
areas would no longer be enforced.22 In February 1998, Donald W.
Brewer, Director of DEC’s Division of Law Enforcement, sent letters
stating that he would enforce the law.23 In response, the State of
Connecticut brought suit against Brewer.24
iii. Majority opinion
On appeal, the Second Circuit undertook the determination of
whether the dispute fell within the Supreme Court’s original and
exclusive jurisdiction under § 1251(a).25 The majority began the
analysis by articulating that the Supreme Court has “broadly intimated
that a plaintiff-State may generally choose whether or not to name
19

Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal
quotations omitted).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 96.

DECOTIIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

684

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

4/21/2015 10:43 AM

[Vol. 45:679

another state as a defendant in litigation challenging some action or
statute of another State,”26 relying on the Supreme Court cases of
Missouri v. Illinois27 and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee28 According to the
majority, as a result of this freedom, Connecticut, by choosing only to
sue New York officers and not the state, could proceed in district court
provided that the state was not the “real party at interest”—i.e., that
looking beyond the named party, the state was not in actuality the party
whose interests would be determined by the suit.29
To determine whether the state was the “real party at interest,”
the majority employed a two-prong test: (1) whether actions
specifically authorized by state law caused the alleged injury and (2)
whether the suit implicated the state’s core sovereign interests.30 In
regard to the first prong, the majority drew a distinction between
actions properly carried out and specifically authorized by state law,
and alleged injuries caused by arbitrary or improper administration of
valid state laws; the latter do not amount to state action.31 The majority
found that the actions were properly carried out and specifically
authorized by state law, and therefore, this first prong was satisfied.32
The majority then undertook analysis of the second prong,
whether the suit implicated the State’s core sovereign interests. In
defining “core sovereign interests,” the majority relied on Supreme
Court pronouncements of the manner in which the Court exercises its
discretionary authority in choosing to exercise original jurisdiction in
suits between the States33; the Court mainly considers the “seriousness
[sic] and dignity of the claim”34 and implications of serious or
important concerns of federalism.35 The majority then coupled these
factors with the rationale that exercising the Court’s original
26

Id. at 98.
In Missouri v. Illinois, Missouri named Illinois as a defendant in order to invoke
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to enjoin the dumping of raw sewage by the
City of Chicago into the Mississippi River. 180 U.S. 208 (1901). The Court rejected
Illinois’s argument that it was not a proper defendant and accepted jurisdiction over
the case. Id. at 242.
28
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Illinois brought suit against Milwaukee to enjoin
the dumping of sewage into Lake Michigan. 406 U.S. 91, 97–98 (1972). The Court
held that its original and exclusive jurisdiction was not invoked because cities were not
instrumentalities of the State, but rather, independent entities. Id. Further, the Court
held that, while Wisconsin could be joined as a defendant, it did not have to be. Id.
29
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 99.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. (citing Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992)).
35
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 99 (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 451 (1992)).
27
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jurisdiction is strongest when sovereign interests are at issue.36 While
recognizing that the Supreme Court’s pronouncements did not
control the question of whether a case fell within the “exclusive”
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but rather only established the
manner in which the Court might exercise its discretion over cases
before it, the majority concluded that the cited decisions “plainly teach
that the rationale for the Court’s original jurisdiction is strongest
where core sovereign interests are at stake.”37 On the basis of this
reasoning, the majority held that Connecticut’s suit did not implicate
a core sovereign interest and therefore did not fall within the Supreme
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.38
The majority then responded to the appellees’ argument that a
state suit against a state’s officers should be considered a suit against
the state, because suits by a state do not encounter the Eleventh
Amendment obstacle that Ex parte Young seeks to circumvent by
permitting citizens to sue state officers for injunctive and declaratory
relief.39 In other words, a state suit against a state’s officers should be
considered a suit against the state because there is an available forum,
whereas without the narrow exception of Ex parte Young, a citizen
would have no forum against unconstitutional acts of a state officer. In
disposing of the argument, the majority found that while Ex parte Young
was not directly applicable, it should be considered broadly to reflect
the notion that a state is only the real party at interest when damages
are sought because a financial judgment against a state requires
depletion of the state treasury, which is a crucial element of
sovereignty.40
As a matter of policy, the majority found such an interpretation
to be advantageous, because otherwise, a state might sue another state
and attempt to invoke the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
only to have the Court decline to exercise its jurisdiction,41 while a
federal district court would be obligated to hear the case if subject
matter jurisdiction exists.42 Thus, the majority found that, because the
Supreme Court, in exercising its discretionary, original jurisdiction,

36

Cahill, 217 F.3d at 100 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 766 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
37
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 100 (citing Maryland, 451 U.S. at 766 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
38
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 103.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 101.
41
Id. at 102.
42
Id.
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considered the “availability of an alternative forum,”43 it stood to reason
that § 1251(a) essentially requires a plaintiff-State to invoke the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction only in cases where the Court is
most likely to exercise its jurisdiction.44
iv. Judge Sotomayor’s Dissent
Circuit Judge Sotomayor dissented from the majority decision on
the grounds that the majority contravened the plain meaning of §
1251(a) in order to create a more efficient mode for the resolution of
suits between states.45 Judge Sotomayor began her analysis with the
plain language of § 1251(a).46 In Judge Sotomayor’s view, the plain
language and legislative history, coupled with the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Mississippi v. Louisiana, made clear the Supreme Court’s
“exclusive” jurisdiction over “all” cases between states.47 Furthermore,
Congress could have required exclusive jurisdiction for “any”
controversy in which a state is a party, as in § 1251(b)(2), but did not.48
Thus, for Judge Sotomayor, the case simply became an issue of whether
New York was the true defendant; if so, the Supreme Court’s exclusive
jurisdiction would be invoked.49
Judge Sotomayor would have found the action to be a controversy
between two states.50 Finding the mere fact that New York was not
named as a defendant not compelling, Judge Sotomayor pointed out
that courts are directed to “look past the pleadings to identify the real
parties in interest.”51 To determine the “real party in interest,” Judge
Sotomayor articulated the general rule that relief sought against an
officer is, in fact, against the sovereign if “the effect of the judgment
would be to restrain the Government from acting, or compel it to act.”52
An exception to the general rule exists only in cases where a state sues
43

Id. (citing Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992)).
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 102 (citing Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77).
45
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105 (Sotomayor, C.J., dissenting).
46
Id.
47
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105 (citing Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77–78) (“The
uncompromising language of 28 U.S.C. §1251(a) . . . gives to this Court ‘original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.’ Though
phrased in terms of a grant of jurisdiction to this Court, the description of our
jurisdiction as ‘exclusive’ necessarily denies jurisdiction of such cases to any other
federal court. This follows from the plain meaning of ‘exclusive’. . . .”).
48
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105
49
Id.
50
Id. (Sotomayor, C.J., dissenting).
51
Id. at 106 (citing Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U.S. 368, 371 (1953)).
52
Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984);
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)).
44
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an official of another state for actions in “abuse or excess of his
powers.”53 Having found that the officers named in the dispute were
clearly operating within the scope of their official capacities, Judge
Sotomayor would have held New York the real party at interest and
therefore would have affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction.54
Additionally, Judge Sotomayor took issue with the majority’s
approach because of its circumvention of the plain language of §
1251(a) and case precedent.55 While Judge Sotomayor recognized that
a plaintiff-state has the discretion to name defendants in preparing its
complaint, plaintiffs are “still constrained by the requirement that
courts look beyond the form of the pleadings.”56
Further, the “core sovereign interests” requirement, in Judge
Sotomayor’s opinion, contravened the language of § 1251(a), its
legislative history, and the case law interpreting the statute in a number
of ways.57 First, the restriction substituted a lower court’s judgment for
the Supreme Court’s determination of which case the Court will
choose to exercise its discretion.58 In fact, the Supreme Court’s rules
“require a complaining state petition the Supreme Court . . . [and the
Supreme Court] has ‘substantial discretion to make case-by-case
judgments as to the practical necessity of an original forum in the
Court.’”59 Second, the Supreme Court has never retreated from the
position that § 1251(a) provides the Supreme Court with the discretion
to make case-by-case judgments.60 While permitting a lower court to
make such a determination might improve efficiency, in Judge
Sotomayor’s opinion, there is no legal basis for inventing such a
device.61 Further, allocating such authority to lower courts could result
in evaluations of the importance of cases that the Supreme Court may
not make.62 In Judge Sotomayor’s opinion, the majority’s justification,
that the Federal Circuit should provide a judicial forum for less
important cases that the Supreme Court may decide to not exercise
jurisdiction over, verified this observation (the obvious concern being
that the lower court is inevitably making the value judgment of which
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105 (citing Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22 (1900)).
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105.
Id. at 107.
Id. (Sotomayor, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 108.
Id.
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 108–09 (quoting SUP. CT. R. 17(3), 506 U.S. 73, 76 (1992)).
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 109.
Id.
Id.
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cases are “less important”).63
The majority’s application of Ex parte Young was similarly
misguided, according to Judge Sotomayor.64 Judge Sotomayor
believed that the principle justification for the application of Ex parte
Young was completely missing because a plaintiff-State, in suing
another state, is not barred by sovereign immunity and therefore has
an available forum (unlike in the context of Ex parte Young where no
forum would be available to address a constitutional wrong).65 In fact,
the Supreme Court has stated that Ex parte Young should not be
invoked where a forum is available to provide relief.66 Therefore, Judge
Sotomayor would have found Ex parte Young irrelevant because
Connecticut could have invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, and interpreting Ex parte Young otherwise would undermine the
Eleventh Amendment immunity as representing any real limitation on
the ability to sue a state.67
B. Dainippon Screen Manufacturing Co. v. CFMT, Inc.
i.

Procedural history

In Dainippon Screen Manufacturing Co. v. CFMT, Inc., the District
Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffappellant’s action for a declaratory judgment against the defendantsappellees, which consisted of a corporation and its holding company.68
The district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction
over the appellee holding company, finding that the holding company
was a necessary and indispensable party.69
ii.

Facts

CFM Technologies Inc. (CFM) incorporated CFMT, Inc. (CFMT)
as a holding company for its intellectual property.70 CFM assigned all
of its patents to CFMT, which CFMT granted back to CFM with
exclusive licensees.71 CFMT was at no time an operating company and

63

Id. at 109–10.
Id. at 110.
65
Id. at 111 (Sotomayor, CJ. (now S.C.J.), dissenting).
66
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 111(citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74
(1996)).
67
Cahill, 217 F.3d at 111–12.
68
Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 1998).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
64
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was wholly-owned by CFM.72 Dainippon Screen Manufacturing Co.,
Ltd. (Dainippon)—a competitor of CFM—and CFM attempted to
negotiate a sublicense because of an infringement issue, but the
negotiations fell through.73 As a result, Dainippon sued CFM, a suit
which CFM moved to dismiss on the ground that CFMT was a necessary
and indispensable party.74
iii. Indispensability analysis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)
The Ninth Circuit, in analyzing the issue of indispensability,
determined that CFMT was not an indispensable party.75 In making
this determination, the court considered the four factors directed by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) to “determine whether in equity and good
conscience” the action could proceed:76
(1) The extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s
absence might prejudice that person or the existing
parties;
(2) The extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or
avoided by:
(A) Protective provisions in the judgment;
(B) Shaping the relief; or
(C) Other measures;
(3) Whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence
would be adequate; and
(4) Whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if
the action were dismissed for non-joinder.77
In regard to the first factor, the court found that prejudice against
an absent party is considered mitigated when the interests of that party
are “adequately protected by those who are present.”78 With this rule
in mind, the court found that CFMT’s interests were adequately
protected by CFM because CFM owned CFMT (and therefore, in an
indirect manner, owned the patent at issue), and had the obvious
interest of maintaining CFMT’s patents.79 In regard to the second
factor, the court found that its ability to shape relief was of little
relevance in a declaratory judgment action because the relief was not
72

Id.
Id. at 1268.
74
Dainippon, 142 F.3d at 1268.
75
Id. at 1273.
76
See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
77
Id.
78
Dainippon, 142 F.3d at 1272 (citing In re Allustiarte, 786 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir.
1986)).
79
Dainippon, 142 F.3d at 1272.
73
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dependent upon the patentee’s presence in court.80 The third factor,
adequacy of the judgment, weighed in favor of permitting suit because
a declaration of invalidity or non-infringement would serve
Dainippon’s interest by guaranteeing that Dainippon was free from
claims of patent infringement by CFMT, regardless of whether CFMT
was present in the suit.81 The fourth factor, whether the plaintiff would
have an adequate remedy if the case was dismissed, favors dismissal if
another forum exists in which all parties could be joined in the suit.82
The Ninth Circuit, however, found it “highly relevant that CFMT [was]
merely CFM’s holding company for the patent in suit” and that there
was no sound reason for dismissing a declaratory judgment against a
parent company on the grounds that its wholly-owned patent holding
subsidiary was an indispensable party.83
C. The University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung
der Wissenschaften e.V.
i.

Procedural history

In Max-Planck, the University of Utah brought an action to correct
inventorship of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,056,704 and 7,078,196 (the “Tuschl
Patents”), naming Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der
Wissenschaften e.V., Max-Planck-Innovation GmbH, Whitehead
Institute for Biomedical Research, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (collectively “nonstate defendants”), and UMass as defendants.84 UMass filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the dispute was between two states and
therefore invoked the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).85 In response, UUtah filed an
amended complaint substituting four UMass officials (“named
officials”)86 in place of UMass.87 The named officials moved to dismiss
arguing that the claim was barred by sovereign immunity, or
alternatively, that UUtah had failed to join UMass as an indispensable
80

Id. at 1272–73.
Id. at 1273.
82
Id. (citing Aguilar v. L.A. Cty., 751 F.2d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1985)).
83
Dainippon, 142 F.3d at 1273.
84
Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften
e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1317 (Fed Cir. 2013).
85
Id. at 1318.
86
Robert L. Caret (President), James R. Julian (Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer), David J. Gray (Senior Vice President for Administration,
Finance, & Technology and University Treasurer), and James P. McNamara (Executive
Director, Office of Technology Management).
87
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1317.
81
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party.88 The district court denied the motion, concluding that the case
did not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
because UUtah had chosen to sue state officials rather than the state
itself, and therefore the district court “had jurisdiction over the action
against the UMass state officials under the ‘Ex parte Young doctrine.’”89
The district court further held that UMass was not an indispensable
party because UMass’s interests would be “adequately represented” by
the existing defendants, and an order directing the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to correct inventorship
would provide adequate relief regardless of UMass’s presence in the
suit.90
ii.

Facts

The underlying dispute in Max-Planck arose out of independent,
biochemistry research occurring at UUtah and UMass.91 Dr. Brenda
Bass, a biochemistry professor at UUtah, was active in RNA
interference (“RNAi”) research, a process by which RNA plays a role
in gene silencing.92 Dr. Brenda Bass’s employment agreement assigned
the rights to all inventions and discoveries resulting from her
employment or research to UUtah, including the rights to any
patents.93 Dr. Thomas Tuschl, a researcher employed by UMass, was
also active in RNAi research.94 Drs. Tuschl and Bass attended
professional conferences at which both presented papers; both
admitted that they were familiar with each other’s work.95
Dr. Tuschl applied for and was granted the Tuschl Patents, on
which Dr. Bass was not a named inventor.96 Dr. Bass claimed the Tuschl
Patents “disclosed and claimed her conception.”97 In response, UUtah
requested that the assignees of the Tuschl Patents cooperate in
petitioning the USPTO to add Dr. Bass as an inventor.98 The assignees
declined the request, at which point UUtah initiated a suit in district
court requesting a correction of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. §256.99
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id.
Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id. at 1318–19.
Id.
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1318.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id.
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1318. If in error an inventor is not named in an issued
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iii. Majority Reasoning
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered three main issues: (1)
whether the district court lacked jurisdiction because, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a), the case fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court; (2) whether UMass was entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity; and (3) whether UMass was an indispensable
party warranting dismissal of the case under Federal Rule 19(b).
1. District court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
and the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court
The court began the discussion of jurisdiction by recognizing that
state universities, unlike their private, corporate counterparts, typically
enjoy sovereign immunity.100 Thus, generally, a state university may
neither be sued for infringement nor forced to defend against an
action for a declaratory judgment of invalidity or non-infringement.101
States, however, do not enjoy sovereign immunity from suits brought
by other states.102 States can also sue citizens of other states without
raising issues of sovereign immunity.103 Thus, the court focused its
analysis on whether the dispute at issue fell under § 1251(a) and was
therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,104 or
under § 1251(b)(3) and was therefore outside the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.105
In interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), the majority relied on Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee for the proposition that the Supreme Court’s
exclusive jurisdiction is “obligatory only in appropriate cases.”106
According to the court, “appropriateness” is determined by analysis of
four factors: (1) the “seriousness and dignity of the claim”; (2) whether
the “named parties” have another forum “where appropriate relief may
be had”; (3) whether the case raises “serious and important” federalism

patent, “the Director may on application of all the parties and assignees. . .issue a
certificate correcting such error.” 35 U.S.C. § 256(a) (2011). “The court before which
such matter is called in question may order correction of the patent on notice and
hearing of all parties concerned and the Director shall issue a certificate accordingly.”
Id. § 256(b).
100
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1319.
101
Id. See also A123 Sys. Inc. v. Hydro–Que., 626 F.3d 1213, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
102
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1319. See also Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130
(1984).
103
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1319–20.
104
Id. at 1320.
105
Id. at 1321–22.
106
Id. at 1320 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 406 U.S. 91, 93–94 (1972)).
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concerns; and (4) whether the named party is the “real party at
interest.”107 Whether a state is the “real and substantial party in
interest” is determined by whether it is a “mandatory” or
“indispensable” party, such that the decree would “operate directly
against it and adequate relief cannot be granted without it.”108 A decree
is said to operate “directly against” a state if the judgment would
expend itself on the state’s treasury, or if an injunction compelling
state administration is sought.109
Applying the statutory framework, the court reasoned that
UUtah’s claim fell outside of the Supreme Court’s exclusive
jurisdiction pursuant to § 1251(b)(3) because UUtah was an arm of
the state suing officers of UMass, who are all citizens of the foreign
state. As such, the Supreme Court could not have exclusive
jurisdiction over the dispute unless the state was the “real party at
issue,” according to § 1251(a).110
To determine if the state was the real party at issue, the court
employed three tests: (1) the majority test in Cahill; (2) the dissent test
in Cahill; and (3) the “mandatory” and “indispensable” test. Under the
Cahill majority test, a state is a real party at interest in a suit against
officers when: (1) the alleged injury is caused by actions specifically
authorized by state law and (2) the suit implicates a state’s core
sovereign interests.111 Applying the Cahill majority test, the court
assumed that the first prong of the analysis was satisfied and then
shifted its focus to the “core sovereign interest” component.112 The
court then held that inventorship rights are not a core sovereign
interest because: (1) the act of inventing is a mental exercise and, as a
result, a state cannot be an inventor; (2) inventorship is distinct from
ownership; and (3) even if inventorship is inseparable from ownership,
federalism concerns are not implicated.113 Thus, under this analysis,
the state was not the “real party at issue” and, therefore, failed to invoke
the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

107

Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1320 (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 451
(1992)).
108
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1320–21 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 (1984)).
109
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1320–21.
110
Id. at 1321–22.
111
Id. at 1322.
112
Id. at 1323.
113
Id.
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Under the Cahill dissent test, the court endeavors to determine
the real party of interest by analyzing whether the “effect of the
judgment would be to restrain the government from acting or compel
it to act.”114 In applying this test, the court held that a judgment would
order the director of the USPTO to correct inventorship and therefore
would not require or restrain UMass from acting.115 Thus, under this
analysis, the state was not the “real party at issue” and, therefore, could
not invoke the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Finally, under the “mandatory” and “indispensable” test, the court
held that UMass was not indispensable on the ground that the court
could grant relief without naming UMass as a party, because the
director of the USPTO would be able to correct inventorship rights
without UMass.116 While the court recognized that the judgment would
“affect” UMass, the court found that granting relief did not amount to
a “decree operating directly against” UMass.117 Thus, the court held
that the state did not amount to the real party of interest in the action,
and therefore, failed to invoke the Supreme Court’s exclusive
jurisdiction.118
2. Eleventh Amendment immunity
The Eleventh Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that: “The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.”119 In interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, the
Court concluded that sovereign immunity “applies only to suits by
citizens against a State,”120 and therefore, the Eleventh Amendment is
inapplicable to an action concerning a state suit against a citizen.121

114

Id. at 1324 (citing Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir.
2000)).
115
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1324.
116
Id.
117
Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101
(1984)).
118
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1325.
119
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
120
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130
(1984)).
121
Id.
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3. Indispensability and dismissal under Fed R. Civ. Pro.
19(b) for failure to join an indispensable party
In making its determination on the dispensability of UMass, the
court first rejected the notion of a per se rule holding patent owners
indispensable, and then moved on to an analysis of the four
appropriateness factors.122 In regard to the first factor, the majority
relied upon Dainippon—a case that permitted suit despite the fact that
no patent owners were joined—for the conclusion that the other
owners who were a party to the suit would adequately represent
UMass’s interests.123 As to the second factor, the court found that the
ability to shape relief to minimize prejudice had little relevance
because the finding on the first factor tended to suggest that there
would be minimal prejudice.124 Regarding the third factor, the court
found that an order directing the USPTO to correct inventorship
would be sufficient in the absence of UMass, with UUtah receiving all
of the relief requested.125 In regard to the fourth factor, the court
concluded that the availability of another forum was not particularly
strong, recognizing that the Supreme Court only rarely accepts such
cases.126 Thus, the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that UMass
was not an indispensable party to the suit.127
iv. Dissent
Circuit Judge Moore dissented from the majority decision on the
grounds that the majority erroneously held that the controversy was
not between two or more states, and further erred by holding that a
patent owner is not indispensable in an action seeking to reassign
title.128
1. District court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
and the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court
In the opinion of Circuit Judge Moore, the district court lacked
jurisdiction over UUtah’s claims against UMass officials.129 While Judge
122

Id. at 1326. See also supra text accompanying note 107.
Id. at 1327 (citing Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266,
1272 (9th Cir. 1998).
124
Id. at 1327–28.
125
Id. at 1328.
126
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1328–29.
127
Id. at 1328.
128
Id. at 1328 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
129
Id.
123
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Moore agreed with the proposition that the Court must look to the
“real party in interest,” she took issue with the majority’s analysis in
making the determination.130
As an initial matter, Judge Moore would have framed the action
as an issue of ownership, rather than simply inventorship.131 In support
of this proposition, Judge Moore cited the complaint where UUtah
alleged that it “should be the sole owner or owner”132 and requested an
“order assignment of all right title and interest” of the Tuschl
patents.133 Further, Judge Moore highlighted that, under 35 U.S.C.
§256(b), parties with an “economic stake” in the patent are proper
defendants who may be subject to a correction of inventorship.134 Yet,
according to Judge Moore, the majority provided no support for the
contention that the UMass officials named in UMass’s stead were
“parties concerned.”135
Interpreting the statute, Judge Moore found that the “core
sovereign interests” test employed by the majority was at odds with the
plain language of § 1251(a), which contains “uncompromising
language” of the Supreme Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction
over “all controversies between two or more States.”136 In Judge
Moore’s view, the majority’s misreading of the statute’s plain meaning
led to the interpretation that a core sovereign interest was required to
implicate the Supreme Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction; the
majority thereby deprived the Supreme Court of the opportunity to
exercise its discretion.137 While the Supreme Court possesses exclusive
and original jurisdiction over all cases between two or more states, it is
not required to exercise its jurisdiction over every controversy.138 The
concept of “core sovereign interests” arises from opinions in which the
Supreme Court articulates its decision to exercise the Court’s
jurisdiction over a particular dispute, not whether the dispute falls
solely within its original jurisdiction.139 By jumbling these two, separate
concepts, Judge Moore found that the majority eliminated the
130

Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1329–30.
132
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329 (citing J.A. 134).
133
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329 (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (citing J.A. 142).
134
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329 (citing Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1359–
60 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
135
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329.
136
Id. (citing Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992)).
137
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329.
138
Id.
139
Id. (citing Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 76–77); see also Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S.
554, 570 (1983).
131
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Supreme Court’s discretion and reallocated this power to the lower
courts to decide which cases will be presented to the Supreme Court.140
Judge Moore also took issue with the majority’s reliance on the
Second Circuit’s split decision in Cahill.141 Further, even applying the
reasoning in Cahill, Judge Moore would have found that the dispute
fell solely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for
two reasons.142 First, a judgment in favor of UUtah would have
restrained UMass’s ability to act in that UMass would no longer be able
to license or assign the Tuschl patents, and UUtah would be able to
exclude UMass from practicing the inventions claimed in its patents.143
Patent rights are the “quintessential right to restrain,” and therefore,
an adverse judgment preventing UMass from exploiting the Tuschl
patents would undoubtedly have the “effect of . . . restrain[ing] the
Government from acting.”144 Even as a co-inventor, UUtah could have
practiced and licensed the patents without UMass’s consent and
without having to account to UMass, restraining UMass from asserting
its rights to the Tuschl patents against UUtah or any UUtah licensees.145
Second, Judge Moore took issue with the majority’s proposition that
UMass would only be “more or less affected” and that transfer of the
Tuschl patents to UUtah would “not deplete the state treasury.”146
Rather, Judge Moore saw the central effect of a judgment against
UMass as depleting the assets of the current owners, one of whom was
the State of Massachusetts.147
Thus, Judge Moore would have found that UMass was a real party
in interest in the case, and therefore, the dispute, in the opinion of the
learned judge, should have fallen squarely within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.148
2. Indispensability and dismissal under Fed R. Civ. Pro.
19(b) for failure to join an indispensable party
Circuit Judge Moore would have also found UMass an
indispensable party to the suit.149 The Federal Circuit has held that
when a plaintiff brings “a declaratory judgment seeking to invalidate a
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1330 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1331 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1331.
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patent or hold it not infringed the patentee is both a necessary and
indispensable” party. 150 Thus, in Judge Moore’s opinion, it would be
illogical to require all patent owners to be joined in suit to invalidate a
patent, but not in a suit over patent ownership.151 Further, the
majority’s reliance on Dainippon for an exception to the rule that all
patent owners be joined relied on an omission of key facts.152 Perhaps
most significantly, in Dainippon, the absent party to the suit was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the named party and therefore had
identical interests.153 While Judge Moore recognized that other
defendants also have an interest in the patents, she was quick to point
out that they do not necessarily represent UMass’s interest, and that
the interests among the parties might very well diverge.154
IV. MISAPPLICATION OF LAW IN MAX–PLANCK AND A DECISION
INCORRECTLY DECIDED ON BOTH SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND
JOINDER GROUNDS
Max-Planck is incorrectly decided because the court contravenes
the plain language of § 1251(a), misapplies Supreme Court case law,
and relies almost entirely on Cahill’s flawed reasoning. The decision
places the doctrine of sovereign immunity in limbo, as it gives the
appearance of applying in a situation for which it was never intended.
Furthermore, as a result of the Federal Circuit’s enthusiasm to hear
the case, the court misapplies the factors of Rule 19(b).

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
i.

The conflated majority framework

The majority begins its analysis by framing this case as a dispute
over whether the State is suing another state invoking § 1251(a), or the
State is suing the citizen of another state invoking § 1251(b)(3).155 As
a result of the court’s desire to squeeze this dispute under §
1251(b)(3), the Federal Circuit seeks to impose limiting criteria upon

150

Id. (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (citing A123 Sys. Inc. v. Hydro-Que., 626 F.3d 1213,
1217–22 (Fed Cir. 2010); Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1094
(Fed Cir. 1998)).
151
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1331 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
152
Id. at 1332.
153
Id. (citing Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266, 1272–73
(9th Cir. 1998); A123 Sys. Inc., 626 F.3d at 1221).
154
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1332.
155
See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text.
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§ 1251(a).156
Looking first to the plain reading of the statute, it is obvious from
the “uncompromising language” of § 1251(a) granting “original and
exclusive” jurisdiction over “all” controversies between states that there
is little room for the majority to glean any limiting requirements from
the statute itself.157 Further, to impose any limiting requirement, the
court must in fact ignore the plain and unambiguous Supreme Court
interpretation of the word “exclusive” as necessarily denying
jurisdiction to other federal courts.158 As Judge (now Justice)
Sotomayor astutely articulated, Congress could have granted
“original,” but not “exclusive,” jurisdiction over controversies between
states as in § 1251(b)(2), but chose otherwise.159
Without any basis for limiting § 1251(a) based on its plain
language, the Federal Circuit was forced to take a creative approach to
Supreme Court precedent. The court did so by latching on to the
language that § 1251(a) is “obligatory only in appropriate cases.”160
From this snippet of Supreme Court language, the majority found an
opening to impose a statutory limiting analysis, by reasoning that such
language requires the court to determine whether or not a case is
“appropriate.”161
Grafting language from Supreme Court cases analyzing proper
application of the Court’s own discretion, the court identified four
factors to determine “appropriateness”: (1) the serious and dignity of
the claim; (2) the availability of an alternative forum; (3) serious and
important federalism concerns; and (4) the real party in interest.162
The court then focused in on the fourth factor, that the court look to
the “real parties at interest,” to align its interpretation with the
reasoning of Cahill (which centered on the issue of whether New York
was the real party at interest).163 Relying on the language of
Cunningham and Illinois, the court reasoned that the real party at
interest is determined by whether it is “mandatory” or

156

See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the imposition of a “core
sovereign interests” requirement).
157
Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77–78 (1992).
158
Id.
159
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
160
See supra note 106 and accompanying text. See also Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 75.
161
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
162
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
163
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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“indispensable”164 such that a decree would operate directly against it.165
The court then applied the majority reasoning of Cahill in an attempt
to cram two of the remaining three factors: (1) the “seriousness and
dignity of the claim;” and (2) the implication of federalism concerns,
under the newly formed umbrella of “real party at interest.”166 Only
after creating this amalgamation of assorted case law does the court
seek to inoculate this case with its cocktail of analytical tests.
Before analyzing the court’s tests, it is important to note a number
of failings in the Federal Circuit’s framing of the analysis. As an initial
matter, the court’s analysis stands as an obvious contravention of
proper statutory interpretation. In the context of jurisdictional
statutes, courts are to begin “with the text of the provision in question,
and move on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in
which it occurs.”167 In Max-Planck, however, the court completely
looked past the plain meaning of the word “exclusive,” which expressly
grants jurisdiction in one court and divests it in others, without
providing any grounds for doing so.168 The court further failed to
consider the statutory language in the context of its overall structure
as well. As Judge Sotomayor correctly noted, Congress could have
altered the language to provide for non-exclusive jurisdiction as it did
in the provisions immediately following § 1251(a).169 In fact, the
Federal Circuit has flipped proper statutory analysis on its head by first
relying on non-binding case law and Supreme Court cases that are not
directly applicable, without any discussion of the legislative history or
the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language.170
Furthermore, it is notable that when one analyzes the case law
from which the language “obligatory only in appropriate cases” is
taken, the phrase is used in a completely separate context.171 In
Mississippi v. Louisiana, the Court found its original jurisdiction to be
164

See Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften
e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick
R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 457 (1883); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97 (1972).
165
Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104
(1984)).
166
See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
167
See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 655 (1995); see also BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 128
(1983) (“The starting point, as always, is the language of the statute.”).
168
See supra note 47 and accompanying text. See also Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506
U.S. 73, 77–78 (1992).
169
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
170
See supra notes 106–108 and accompanying text.
171
See supra note 106 and accompanying text; see also Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 75;
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93–94 (1972).
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“obligatory only in appropriate cases,” to the extent that the Supreme
Court was permitted to exercise discretion over whether or not the
Court would choose to hear a particular case.172 At no point in
Mississippi is there any dispute as to whether the grant of “exclusive”
jurisdiction vests authority to hear a controversy between states solely
in the Supreme Court.173 Yet, disregarding the express language of
Mississippi, which states that exclusive jurisdiction necessarily divests
jurisdiction in all other courts,174 the majority in Max-Planck
manipulates the Supreme Court’s language to reach the contrary
conclusion.175
It is notable that the majority in Max-Planck sought to frame the
analysis in such a way, considering that the court in Cahill took a more
direct approach by simply stating that a plaintiff-State has free reign to
choose defendants, and the court need only determine who is a “real
party at interest.”176 The manner in which the Max-Planck majority
attempts to weave “appropriateness” factors into an analysis of the “real
party at interest” suggests that the court recognized the shaky doctrinal
ground upon which the majority test in Cahill was founded and sought
to fortify its position. In so doing, however, the court merely muddled
together two, distinct principles which were never meant to be
intertwined—the determination of a real party at interest and the
Supreme Court’s determination of whether or not to exercise
discretionary authority.
ii.

Failings of the Three Tests Used to Determine a Real
Party at Interest

Having grafted a test of “appropriateness” onto § 1251(a), the
court reasoned that because UMass officers are citizens of a foreign
state, § 1251(b)(3) applies unless the state is the “real party at interest,”
thus invoking § 1251(a).177 The court, however, faced the obvious

172

See Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77 (“We first exercised this discretion not to accept
original actions in cases within our nonexclusive original jurisdiction . . . But we have
since carried over its exercise to actions . . . where our jurisdiction is exclusive.”).
173
See id. at 78 (“[T]he description of our jurisdiction as ‘exclusive’ necessarily
denies jurisdiction of such cases to any other federal court. This follows from the plain
meaning of ‘exclusive,’ see WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 890 (2d ed.
1942) (‘debar from possession’)”); see also, e.g., California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 63
(1979).
174
Id.
175
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
176
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
177
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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difficulty of deciding which test is correct to impose in making this
determination. Rather than make a determination, the court chose to
employ three, seemingly relevant analyses.
a. Failings of the Cahill majority test
The first test the majority employed in Max-Planck is based entirely
on the majority opinion in Cahill. Under the Cahill majority analysis, a
state is a real party at interest in a suit against officers if: (1) the alleged
injury is authorized by state law, and (2) the suit implicates a state’s
core sovereign interests.178 The first prong in the analysis is derived
from Louisiana v. Texas, a suit against an official who allegedly acted
beyond the scope of his office, i.e., in “abuse or excess of powers,”
where the Supreme Court determined that such action is not a
controversy between states.179 The second prong, however, is derived
from more tenuous reasoning. In support of the “core sovereign
interests” factor, the court first looked to remarks the Supreme Court
had made, pronouncing the manner in which the Court chooses to
exercise discretionary authority.180 From these pronouncements, the
majority hijacked two factors: (1) “the serious[ness] and dignity of the
claim”181 and (2) the “serious[ness] and important concerns of
federalism.”182 Recognizing that these two factors are not directly
applicable to the case at hand, the majority sought to justify grafting
this analysis onto a new context by relying on Justice Rehnquist’s
dissent in Maryland v. Louisiana; in his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated
that he “would require that the State’s claim involve some tangible
relation to a state’s sovereign interest” before choosing to exercise the
Court’s jurisdiction.183 Adopting Justice Rehnquist’s position is
untenable for a number of reasons. First, as a dissent, Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion is not controlling law. Second, and perhaps most
importantly, the fundamental reason for Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is
that the statutory construction and controlling opinion do not limit
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in any way.184 In fact, Justice
178

See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
Louisiana v. Texas 176 U.S. 1, 22 (1900); see also Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v.
Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, C.J., dissenting).
180
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
181
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
182
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
183
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
184
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 770 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“The basic problem with the Court’s opinion, in my view, is that it articulates no
limiting principles that would prevent this Court from being deluged by original
actions brought by original actions brought by States . . .”).
179
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Rehnquist recognized and expressly articulated that the “problem is
accentuated . . . because it falls within our original and exclusive
jurisdiction, which means that similar cases not only can be but must
be brought here.”185
The majority in Cahill even seems to recognize the unconvincing
nature of the reasoning by which it concocted the “core sovereign
interests” test, stating that “these cases do not control the question we
face here”; yet, the majority continues with its reasoning, unfazed by a
lack of controlling authority, on the ground that the opinions “plainly
teach that the rationale for the Court’s original jurisdiction is strongest
where core sovereign interests are at stake.”186
b. The correct, but misapplied, Cahill dissent test
The second test the majority employed in Max-Planck was based
on Judge Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion in Cahill. Unlike the majority
analysis, Judge Sotomayor’s test was founded upon stable, controlling
Supreme Court doctrine and, of the three tests utilized, provided the
proper statutory interpretation. Under the Cahill dissent analysis, a
dispute between the states falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court under § 1251(a).187 The only issue left to resolve is
whether the state is the real party at interest.188 A state is a real party at
interest in a suit against officers if “the effect of the judgment would
be to restrain the government from acting or compel it to act.”189 This
analysis was derived primarily from Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, where the Court drew on cases involving suits against state
officials barred by the Eleventh Amendment as being against the State
itself.190 In Pennhurst, the Court articulated the general rule “that relief
sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if
the decree would operate against the latter.”191 Further delineating the
general rule, a decree is considered to operate against the State if “the
judgment sought would expend itself on the pubic treasury . . . or
interfere with the public administration”192 or the effect of the
judgment would be to “restrain the government from acting or compel

185

Id. at 770–771.
Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2000).
187
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
188
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
189
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
190
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984); see also
Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
191
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101.
192
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947).
186
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it to act.”193 This rather bright-lined rule is excepted only by actions in
“abuse or excess of power.”194
The only failing of Judge Sotomayor’s analysis in the context of
Max-Planck is that it is inexplicably placed under an arbitrary umbrella
of “appropriateness.” Notably, in Cahill, however, Judge Sotomayor’s
analysis occurs in the context of determining the “real party at
interest.”195 It is not a component of a larger, overall framework for
determining “appropriateness,” but rather is illogically superimposed
by the majority.
c. Failings of the “mandatory” and “indispensable” test
The third test the majority employed in Max-Planck, considered
the “broad view” of Supreme Court cases, is really a restatement of
Judge Sotomayor’s dissent, but in terms so broad as to deprive the
Court’s opinion of any real analysis. Unwittingly articulated as a
separate analysis due to the conflated framework the majority in MaxPlanck developed, the court attempted to stuff the entirety of Judge
Sotomayor’s analysis under the language “indispensable” or
“mandatory,” such that it could be quickly dismissed.
For the language “mandatory” and “indispensable,” the majority
in Max-Planck relied on two cases that stood in direct opposition to the
conclusion the majority sought to reach. In Cunningham, the Court
held that the plaintiffs could not bring suit against the governor, who
had no personal interest in the matter, in “an attempt to make the state
of Georgia a party to the suit through the defendant as governor, so as
to bind the state by the judgment and decision of the court in case.”196
Georgia, as an indispensable party, needed to be joined to the suit in
order to receive the relief the plaintiff was seeking against Georgia.197
In Illinois, the Court held that its original and exclusive jurisdiction was
not invoked because only a city, which is not an instrumentality of the
State, was named as a defendant, and while the State could be joined
as a permissible party, it was not mandatory it be made one.198 Of these
two cases, Illinois is completely irrelevant to the analysis considering
193

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949); see also Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 502 (1921).
194
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
195
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
196
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 449 (1883).
197
Id. at 451 (“The principle is conceded in all the cases, and whenever it can be
clearly seen that the state is an indispensable party . . . to grant relief sought, it [lower
courts] will refuse to take jurisdiction.”).
198
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97–98; see also supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
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that the defendant, namely, the city, was a completely separate entity
from the State; there was no need to determine the “real party at
interest.” Cunningham is more compelling, considering it is essentially
concerned with determining the “real party at interest,” however, it
does not necessarily stand for the proposition that a state must be
shown to be “indispensable” in order to be held a “real party at
interest.” Rather, it merely remarks that if relief cannot be granted
without a state present, the state is indispensable, and suing a state
official operating in his or her official capacity cannot act as a stand-in
to bind a state.199
Accepting the label of “indispensable” despite its contextual
misplacement (and perhaps future risk of conflation with Rule 19(b))
led the majority to the issue of relief, mainly an analysis of whether an
adverse judgment would affect state action. While Judge Sotomayor’s
analysis is situated on firmer analytical ground, the “wider analysis”
essentially arrives at the same test derived from Pennhurst. The majority
erred in its application of this third test only to the extent that it did
not devote proper effort to the inquiry, disposing of Pennhurst in a
string citation.200 It further erred to the degree that the “wider view”
test is repetitive.
iii. UMass should be the real party at interest regardless of
the test applied
Beyond the errors in the majority’s reasoning, even if tests are
applied as presented by the majority opinion, UMass should be the
“real party at interest.”
a. Application of the Cahill majority test
The majority accepted as a given that the actions of UMass
officials causing the alleged injury were authorized by state law.201
Moving then to the second prong, the court held that inventorship
rights are not a core sovereign interest because: (1) the act of inventing
is a mental exercise; (2) inventorship is distinct from ownership; and
(3) federalism concerns are not implicated.202
The majority’s first reason fails on its own terms. The State, as a
sovereign, operates entirely through the mental processes or physical
actions of state employees who act on behalf of the State. In fact, the
199

See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
See Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften
e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed Cir. 2013).
201
See id. at 1323.
202
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
200
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concept of sovereign immunity is based around this principle, as it
permits state actors to operate within the scope of their duties without
fear of suit—i.e., “to protect the government from claims arising out
of its lawful activity.”203 To hold otherwise would be to undermine a
fundamental principle of sovereign immunity; taken to its extreme, it
suggests that each law the state legislature passes is directly attributable
to the mental capacities of the representative who drafted the law
rather than the legislative body as a whole. As a policy matter, such a
situation is obviously untenable.
Accepting the majority’s assertion that inventing is a mental act
that affects only natural persons, and therefore, that “inventors cannot
be corporations or sovereigns,” there is no reason any of the non-state,
institutional defendants or the officers of UMass should be joined to
the suit as defendants.204 As a matter of logic, if “inventorship”
concerns only individuals, then only individuals named as “inventors”
should be parties to the suit (namely Dr. Tuschl), because relief may
only come from “inventors.” This argument obviously defies logic.
Even the majority recognizes, without reservation that “state
universities frequently obtain assignments on patents invented by their
faculties and staff, just as private corporations often obtain assignments
on patents invented by their employees.”205
Second, such a rigid understanding of “inventorship” results in
similarly flawed logic in seeking to distinguish “inventorship” from
“ownership.” UUtah names all parties with rights to the patent because
UUtah does not merely seek to have the inventor’s name included on
the patent, but rather seeks ownership rights through a change in
“inventorship” status.206 If inventorship status and ownership were
distinct as the majority would suggest, UUtah would have no incentive
to pursue litigation over such a trivial matter as whose name is credited
(especially considering the cost of an appeal). The litigation is worth
pursuing because UUtah recognizes that “[e]ach co-inventor
presumptively owns a pro rata[,] undivided interest in the entire
patent, no matter what their [sic] respective contributions.”207 The
203

See Margot C. Wuebbels, Commerical Terrorism: A Commercial Activity Exception
under §1605(a)(2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1123, 1141
(1993); see also Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 725 (3d Cir. 1979) (“The primary purpose
of the 11th Amendment is to assure federal courts do not interfere with state’s public
policy and its administration of public affairs.”).
204
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1323.
205
Id. at 1319.
206
Id. at 1330 (“A finding that Dr. Bass is a co-inventor of the Tuschl II patents will
result in UUtah co-owning those patents.”).
207
Id. at 1323 (quoting Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1465
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formalistic view adopted by the majority in framing the conflict solely
in terms of “inventorship” fails because the inherent value in
“inventorship” is the property right of an undivided interest in the
patent.208
Seeking to bolster its argument, the majority continued with the
sweeping statement that even if ownership of a patent is in dispute,
such a dispute does not “implicate serious and important concerns of
federalism,” because patent rights are not “akin to State ownership of
water rights, natural resources, or other property.”209 The majority,
however, provided no analysis as to why a patent does not fall under
state ownership of “other property.” It seems difficult to distinguish a
patent as the “governmental grant of a right to exclude others from
making, using, marketing, selling, offering for sale, or importing an
invention” from an exclusionary right a sovereign might exercise over
a natural resource.210 In Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, the Ninth Circuit
found that an Indian tribe, protected from suit by sovereign immunity,
was indispensable because a reallocation of a harvest of fish from the
Columbia River would require a reallocation of the quota (i.e., a
percentage of ownership of the harvest) the tribe would receive.211
While the subject matter of the cases differ, the similarities are
uncanny. In Max-Planck, UMass could not be joined as a party to the
suit without invoking the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
because it was a sovereign. In Makah Indian Tribe, the Indian tribes
could not be joined to the suit because they were immune as
sovereigns.212 In Max-Planck, the resource in question is the pro rata
share of an invention through the exclusionary right of a patent. In
Makah Indian Tribe, the resource in question is the pro rata share of a
fish harvest—i.e., the exclusionary right of a tribe to own a portion of
the fish harvest.213 It seems illogical to hold that a pro rata distribution
of fish would be of greater importance to the sovereign than pro rata
ownership of a patent right. In other words, it seems unlikely that
Makah Indian Tribe would come out differently if the Indian tribes had
collectively owned a pro rata interest in a patent. Without any
reasoning, however, it is impossible to do more than speculate as to
why a patent interest would not qualify as “other property.”

(Fed Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted)).
208
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1323.
209
Id. (citing Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2000)).
210
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1300 (10th ed. 2014).
211
Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1990).
212
Id.
213
Id.
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b. Application of the Cahill dissent test
The majority holds that “the effect of the judgment” would not
“restrain the Government from acting or compel it to act”214 because a
judgment ordering the Director of the USPTO to correct inventorship
will neither require nor restrain UMass from acting, because the
Director of the USPTO is the individual who will be physically
compelled to change the inventorship status under 35 U.S.C. §
256(a).215 Never was a more “form over substance” statement ever
made. While the majority is correct that §256 permits the Director,
“with proof of the facts and such other requirements as may be
imposed, [to] issue a certificate correcting such error [of omitting
inventors],” the court decree compelling the Director’s action
operates, in substance, as a restraint on UMass’s ownership rights of
the Tuschl patents.216 Patents are by definition a “governmental grant
of a right to exclude others.”217 By altering the ownership structure
through the compelled action of the Director, deprivation of UMass’s
ownership rights, either in their entirety or through adjustment of a
pro rata share of ownership, will permit UUtah to restrain UMass from
practicing the inventions claimed in the patents, licensing the patents,
or assigning the patents.218
c. Application of the “Mandatory” and “Indispensable”
Test
The majority finds UMass neither “indispensable” nor
“mandatory,” because while UMass “may be ‘more or less affected by
the decision,’ the court’s decree will not deplete the state treasury.”219
The majority once again provides little support for this contention
other than perhaps the fact that monetary damages are not being
sought.220 It is notable, however, that universities earn over a billion
dollars annually from licensing inventions.221 In fact, the court
specifically notes the Tuschl patents as “having generated hundreds of

214

Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1323.
Id.
216
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
217
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1300 (10th ed. 2014).
218
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1330–31 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
219
Id. at 1324 (majority opinion) (citing Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R.
Co., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883)).
220
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1324.
221
Goldie Blumenstyk, Universities Report $1.8–Billion in Earnings on Inventions in
2011, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 28, 2012), http://chronicle.com/
article/University–Inventions–Earned/133972.
215
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millions of dollars in revenue.”222 Knowing that the Tuschl patents
generated millions of dollars in revenue, and that a change in
inventorship would adjust the pro rata portion of profits being
allocated to the various owners, it is difficult to imagine how a decree
in this instance would not significantly impact revenue to the state
treasury, considering that the income a state university generates is
paid to the state treasury.
B. Sovereign Immunity
i.

Sovereign immunity’s inapplicability to the present
dispute

The majority in Max-Planck is quick to dispose of the sovereign
immunity argument on the ground that sovereign immunity does not
apply to an action in which a state is suing a citizen.223 While the
majority is correct in this instance, it is interesting to note that the
majority in Cahill, upon which the majority in Max-Planck relied,
undertook an analysis to show that the spirit of Ex parte Young
supported limiting the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.224
The majority in Cahill misapplied Ex parte Young in a number of
ways. As an initial matter, the majority notes that Ex parte Young is not
applicable to a dispute between states.225 The Ex parte Young doctrine
is a limited exception created by the Supreme Court with the primary
purpose of providing a forum to address a constitutional wrong where
otherwise no forum would exist.226 In the case of disputes between
states, Ex parte Young has no place because a state has exclusive access
to the highest court in the land.227 Additionally, the Second Circuit’s
broad application of the “spirit” of Ex parte Young is directly contrary to
the Supreme Court’s continual effort to limit the doctrine.228 As the
Supreme Court articulated in Idaho v. Coeur d’ Alene Tribe of Idaho:

222

Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1331 n.1 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
224
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
225
Id.
226
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996); see also Idaho v.
Coeur d’ Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 274 (1997).
227
Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 111 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor,
C.J., dissenting).
228
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984)
(holding that Young may not be invoked to permit suits against State officials for
violations of State law); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986) (stating that Young
is narrowly tailored to conform to only those specific situations in which it is necessary
to allow a federal court to vindicate federal rights).
223
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To interpret Young to permit a federal court-action to
proceed in every case where prospective, declaratory, and
injunctive relief is sought against an officer, named in his
individual capacity, would be to adhere to an empty
formalism and to undermine the principle . . . that Eleventh
Amendment immunity represents a real limitation on a
federal court’s federal-question jurisdiction. The real
interest served by the Eleventh Amendment are [sic] not to
be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of captions and
pleading. Application of the Young exception must reflect a
proper understanding of its role in our federal system . . . .229
Thus, while correctly noting that sovereign immunity does not apply
to the dispute at hand, the majority adopts an analysis for resolving the
dispute which relies on misapplied doctrine.
ii.

The reason a sovereign immunity argument seems to
apply to the present dispute

It is clear that sovereign immunity does not contemplate
controversies between two or more states or between a state and a
citizen. Yet, despite the court’s rapid rejection of such argument, the
defense of sovereign immunity is not so outlandish as to warrant its
dismissal without analysis. The Court’s invention of the ability of a
state to sue a foreign state actor operating within the scope of his or
her employment (for which a state actor would normally receive
sovereign immunity) in place of the state puts the court in an
uncomfortable limbo between § 1251(a) and § 1251(b)(3). A state is
quite clearly free to sue a citizen under § 1251(b)(3), and the State is
also free to sue another state under § 1251(a), but the repercussions
of a state suing a state employee working within the scope of his or her
employment is not contemplated. Typically, a state employee working
within the scope of his or her employment is entitled to sovereign
immunity.230 Thus, it would stand to reason that a state suing a state
employee for actions taken within the scope of his or her employment
would raise a similar sovereign immunity issue. Logically, however, this
is not the case because a state employee acting within the scope of his
or her employment acts on behalf of the sovereign, and as such, a state
can properly bring suit against the defendant-state. Permitting a
plaintiff-state to plead around a defendant-state by joining a state
official destroys this logic and places the concept of sovereign
immunity in an untenable position.
229
230

Coeur d’ Alene, 521 U.S. at 270.
See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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C. Rule 19(b) – Indispensable Party
i.

The factors weigh in favor of finding indispensability

As a general rule, all co-owners must be joined in an action
affecting their patent.231 The Max-Planck majority’s attempt to
distinguish the case law requiring patent owners to be named as parties
on the ground that the cases concern standing to bring suit rather than
indispensability is lacking.232 It would be inequitable to suggest that all
patent owners must be joined in a suit seeking to invalidate a patent,
but not in a suit where their own ownership is at issue.233 This
argument’s logical failings are further highlighted by consideration of
§256(b)’s requirement that a court provide notice to those with an
“economic stake” in a patent before ordering correction of
inventorship.234
In support of disregarding the general rule, the majority looks to
the case of Dainippon and concludes that the facts of Max-Planck are
stronger than Dainippon.235 The majority’s analysis in Max-Planck,
however, is unavailing because it omits certain highly relevant facts of
Dainippon.236 The majority concludes that UUtah’s case is stronger on
the first factor in favor of indispensability because, in Dainippon, the
suit was permitted to continue even though no patent owners were
joined.237 The majority, however, omits the fact that CFMT (the
holding company of all patents) was incorporated entirely for the
purpose of holding CFM’s patents and operated at all times as a whollyowned subsidiary of CFM.238 Because the parties’ interests were
therefore “not just common but identical,” the suit was permitted to
go forward without the patent owner being named.239 While it is true
that in Dainippon the defendants were jointly represented by legal
counsel, the fact that defendants in Max-Planck were jointly
represented by legal counsel is not dispositive; a significant difference
231

See Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1467 (Fed Cir. 1998).
Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften
e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Alfred E. Mann Found. for
Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
233
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1331 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
234
Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
235
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
236
Id.
237
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
238
See Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266, 1267–68 (9th Cir.
1998).
239
See A123 Sys. v. Hydro-Que., 626 F.3d 1213, 1221 (Fed Cir. 2010) (discussing
Dainippon in support of the holding that an absent patentee is indispensable when the
named party has “overlapping” but not “identical” interests).
232
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exists between legal representation of essentially one client (the
second client being a wholly-owned subsidiary of the first client) and
legal representation of as many as four, distinct entities whose interests
might diverge over the course of a litigation.240 Furthermore, the mere
fact that UMass entered into an agreement by which Alnylam (a nonstate defendant) received control over the suit is not dispositive, as the
agreement is contingent on the absence of a conflict of interest.241
The second factor provides little guidance, as it is based primarily
on the first factor.242 In regard to the third factor, the majority
compounds its mistaken argument by relying on the hollow formalism
that directing the USPTO to correct inventorship would not be
insufficient in the absence of UMass.243 In responding to the
defendant’s contention that an order could not be binding on UMass,
the majority postulates that the order would be binding on the
USPTO, which could then change inventorship.244 This argument is
problematic because it directly contradicts the majority’s jurisdictional
argument that an adverse judgment would not directly operate against
UMass.245 Following the majority’s conclusion through to its logical
end, the majority would hold that UMass would not be directly affected
by a change in inventorship status, yet UUtah would be able to receive
all of the relief it requests (including a change in ownership of UMass’s
interest, or at the least a pro rata reduction of UMass’s interest).246 In
regard to the fourth factor, the majority determines that despite the
clear language of § 1251(a) requiring exclusive jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court, the possibility that the Supreme Court would accept
the case weighs only slightly against UUtah.247

240

See Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften
e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore, C.J. dissenting).
241
Id. at 1328 (noting that the majority recognizes the possibility of a conflict of
interest and UMass’s then-ability to renew its motion).
242
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
243
See Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at1328.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 1324.
246
Id. at 1327; contra Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that a party is indispensable on the ground that any relief would result
in reallocation of the share of the party who had properly invoked sovereign
immunity).
247
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1328.
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If the factors do not weigh in favor of indispensability,
there is no logical reason for UMass officers to be
joined

Even accepting the majority’s conclusion that UMass need not be
joined as an indispensable party for UUtah to receive adequate relief,
the majority fails to consider the shortcomings of permitting joinder
of UMass officials.248 In Cahill, the alleged injury occurred as a result
of the state officials’ actions, and the relief sought would come in the
form of an injunction preventing the officials’ enforcement of the New
York law at issue.249 Thus, the effect of the judgment would operate
directly against the officials in the form of an injunction. In MaxPlanck, the officials named as parties have no ownership interest in the
patent (nor any economic stake).250 The officials named are in no way
central to the controversy at issue, nor are they in a position to provide
any form of relief other than straw-man standing, so that UMass might
be bound despite not being party to a suit (in violation of a
fundamental tenant of due process that a court may not bind a nonparty). Further, by permitting such joinder, the majority has ruled in
contravention of the express direction of the Supreme Court in
Cunningham.251
D. Possible Solutions without Misapplying the Law
The majority in Max-Planck is undoubtedly driven by the policy
concern that, if left to the Supreme Court, disputes between state
universities over patent rights will go unheard.252 While this policy
concern is well-founded, incorrectly interpreting the plain meaning of
a statute by conflating and misreading Supreme Court precedent will
undoubtedly cause more harm than good over time.253 Already, the
248

Id.
Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2000).
250
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1329.
251
See Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 457 (1883) (“In
Cunningham the Court held that the plaintiffs could not bring suit against the
governor, who had no personal interest in the matter, in “an attempt to make the state
of Georgia a party to the suit through the defendant as governor, so as to bind the
state by the judgment and decision of the court in case.”).
252
Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1328 (citing LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 157
(10th ed. 2010)) (observing that, of the 70 cases the Court heard in the 2007 term,
only one fell under the Court’s original jurisdiction).
253
See Cahill, 217 F.3d at 105 (Sotomayor, C.J., dissenting) (“As a policy matter, I
do not disagree that this creative approach to §1251(a) makes the resolution of
seemingly less weight disputes between States more efficient, faster, and thus likely
more desirable for the States and, perhaps, the busy Supreme Court as well. But the
majority’s interpretation of §1251(a) is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute . . .
249
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effect of Cahill’s decision to make an end-run around § 1251(a) is
observable in the Max-Planck majority’s application of three distinct
tests, two of which are substantially identical, amidst a conflated
framework that injects the Supreme Court’s discretionary authority
analysis into determining a “real party at interest.”
i.

The Supreme Court can articulate that lower courts are
permitted to determine what is “appropriate” and
then articulate an appropriate test

The most direct way to alter the statutory interpretation to permit
jurisdiction over “inferior suits” between the states would be for the
Supreme Court to make a pronouncement on the matter. While the
Court has already taken a position on the issue in Maryland v.
Louisiana, perhaps Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is more compelling in
an increasingly technology driven world.254 The Court might then
articulate a uniform analysis for limiting its own original jurisdiction
such that inferior cases between the states might be heard in the lower
federal courts.
If the Court does not desire to go so far as to consider Maryland v.
Louisiana, a “remnant of abandoned doctrine,” lower courts would be
well-served to have the correct analysis for determining a “real party at
interest” articulated before a circuit split inevitably develops. Under
the current statutory framework, Judge Sotomayor’s analysis is quite
clearly correct (and, by extension, the majority in UUtah’s
“mandatory” or “indispensable” framework is permissible as it arrives
at Pennhurst, substantially the same place as Sotomayor’s analysis).255
Practically, it is also the clearest analysis, cutting directly to the heart
of the “real party at interest” issue without any need for surplusage.
ii.

The legislature can make an exception for patent
disputes

Another way to handle the conflict between the statutory
language and policy concerns would be for the legislature to enact an
exception (particularly for patents which are undoubtedly a state
property interest). While the Max-Planck majority’s reliance on Cahill,
which subsequently depends upon an extension of the spirit of Ex parte
Young, may have been suitable for cases enjoining officers of a state, it
stretches a bit too far in attempting to allow officers to be joined for
and depends upon a questionable reading of Supreme Court precedent.”).
254
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
255
See supra note 189 and accompanying text; see also supra note 200 and
accompanying text.
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property matters. Although equipped with no statutorily legitimate
way of doing so, the Max-Planck majority’s instinct to attempt to fit the
dispute under the § 1251(b)(3) exception is not an unreasonable one.
As a matter of expediency, a new exception (substantially similar to §
1251(b)(3) in that it could create original but not exclusive
jurisdiction over a claim) would allow lower courts to hear disputes
unlikely to be heard by the Supreme Court, while permitting the
legislature to narrowly tailor the new exception, perhaps even only to
patents and/or commercial state activity (thus retaining exclusive
jurisdiction over cases where “core sovereign interests” are at issue).
iii. Dr. Bass and UUtah can be required to protect their
rights by filing a patent and then provoking an
interference proceeding at the USPTO
Finally, as Judge Moore notes in Max-Planck, the USPTO could
require state universities to first file a patent and then provoke an
interference proceeding at the USPTO.256 This would likely only “kick
the can down the road,” however, as any escalation to a district court
would once again result in the same problem at issue.
V. CONCLUSION
While the court’s efforts to hear Max-Planck are noble as a matter
of public policy, the Federal Circuit’s analysis is quite obviously
problematic. As an initial matter, it requires ignoring proper statutory
interpretation and conflating two distinct analyses: the Supreme
Court’s exercise of discretion and the determination of a “real party at
interest.” It then compounds the issue by binding a non-party to the
judgment through a set of straw-men who have no direct interest in the
suit whatsoever.
Looking past the merits, the legal implications of the Federal
Circuit’s decision are problematic as well. Another court reading the
analysis will likely find it difficult to determine which of the three
analyses should be employed in determining if a case is “appropriate”
and therefore obligatory on the Supreme Court, or whether it is
permissible for the lower court to exercise jurisdiction. Further, it is
unclear whether a lower court even has the authority to make such a
determination, or whether it must be left to the Supreme Court’s
discretion.

256

Max-Planck, 734 F.3d at 1331 n.2.
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Undoubtedly, the uncertainty arises from the opinion because, in
fact, only the Supreme Court has the authority to determine whether
or not to exercise discretion. Similarly, the invented analysis of the
majority is logically tenuous at best, leading to a standard which is both
haphazard and repetitious. Such analysis inevitably results in a
decision that defies even its own logic and creates a situation in which
an action is permitted to proceed in the absence of patent owners
whose ownership stake is at issue.
To rectify the issue at hand, either the Supreme Court, or the
legislature through statutory amendment, needs to create an
exception whereby patent disputes over ownership can be vindicated
between state universities in lower courts without burdening the
Supreme Court’s docket and without flouting the central legal
principles of precedent and statutory interpretation.

